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Abstract. We propose the Square Attack, a score-based black-box l2-
and l∞-adversarial attack that does not rely on local gradient infor-
mation and thus is not affected by gradient masking. Square Attack is
based on a randomized search scheme which selects localized square-
shaped updates at random positions so that at each iteration the per-
turbation is situated approximately at the boundary of the feasible set.
Our method is significantly more query efficient and achieves a higher
success rate compared to the state-of-the-art methods, especially in the
untargeted setting. In particular, on ImageNet we improve the average
query efficiency in the untargeted setting for various deep networks by
a factor of at least 1.8 and up to 3 compared to the recent state-of-
the-art l∞-attack of Al-Dujaili & OReilly (2020). Moreover, although
our attack is black-box, it can also outperform gradient-based white-box
attacks on the standard benchmarks achieving a new state-of-the-art
in terms of the success rate. The code of our attack is available at
https://github.com/max-andr/square-attack.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are of particular concern when it comes to applications
of machine learning which are safety-critical. Many defenses against adversarial
examples have been proposed [26,62,45,5,37,1,7] but with limited success, as new
more powerful attacks could break many of them [12,4,40,14,63]. In particular,
gradient obfuscation or masking [4,40] is often the reason why seemingly robust
models turn out to be non-robust in the end. Gradient-based attacks are most
often affected by this phenomenon (white-box attacks but also black-box attacks
based on finite difference approximations [40]). Thus it is important to have
attacks which are based on different principles. Black-box attacks have recently
become more popular [41,9,51] as their attack strategies are quite different from
the ones employed for adversarial training, where often PGD-type attacks [37]
are used. However, a big weakness currently is that these black-box attacks need
to query the classifier too many times before they find adversarial examples, and
their success rate is sometimes significantly lower than that of white-box attacks.
∗Equal contribution.
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Fig. 1. Avg. number of queries
of successful untargeted l∞-attacks
on three ImageNet models for
three score-based black-box at-
tacks. Square Attack outperforms
all other attacks by large margin
In this paper we propose Square Attack,
a score-based adversarial attack, i.e. it can
query the probability distribution over the
classes predicted by a classifier but has no ac-
cess to the underlying model. The Square At-
tack exploits random search3 [46,48] which
is one of the simplest approaches for black-
box optimization. Due to a particular sam-
pling distribution, it requires significantly
fewer queries compared to the state-of-the-
art black-box methods (see Fig. 1) in the
score-based threat model while outperforming
them in terms of success rate, i.e. the percent-
age of successful adversarial examples. This
is achieved by a combination of a particular
initialization strategy and our square-shaped updates. We motivate why these
updates are particularly suited to attack neural networks and provide conver-
gence guarantees for a variant of our method. In an extensive evaluation with
untargeted and targeted attacks, three datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10, ImageNet),
normal and robust models, we show that Square Attack outperforms state-of-
the-art methods in the l2- and l∞-threat model.
2 Related Work
We discuss black-box attacks with l2- and l∞-perturbations since our attack
focuses on this setting. Although attacks for other norms, e.g. l0, exist [41,19],
they are often algorithmically different due to the geometry of the perturbations.
l2- and l∞-score-based attacks. Score-based black-box attacks have only
access to the score predicted by a classifier for each class for a given input. Most
of such attacks in the literature are based on gradient estimation through finite
differences. The first papers in this direction [6,30,56] propose attacks which
approximate the gradient by sampling from some noise distribution around the
point. While this approach can be successful, it requires many queries of the
classifier, particularly in high-dimensional input spaces as in image classifica-
tion. Thus, improved techniques reduce the dimension of the search space via
using the principal components of the data [6], searching for perturbations in
the latent space of an auto-encoder [55] or using a low-dimensional noise dis-
tribution [31]. Other attacks exploit evolutionary strategies or random search,
e.g. [3] use a genetic algorithm to generate adversarial examples and alleviate
gradient masking as they can reduce the robust accuracy on randomization- and
discretization-based defenses. The l2-attack of [28] can be seen as a variant of
random search which chooses the search directions in an orthonormal basis and
tests up to two candidate updates at each step. However, their algorithm can have
suboptimal query efficiency since it adds at every step only small (in l2-norm)
3 It is an iterative procedure different from random sampling inside the feasible region.
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modifications, and suboptimal updates cannot be undone as they are orthogonal
to each other. A recent line of work has pursued black-box attacks which are
based on the observation that successful adversarial perturbations are attained
at corners of the l∞-ball intersected with the image space [0, 1]d [49,2,39]. Search-
ing over the corners allows to apply discrete optimization techniques to generate
adversarial attacks, significantly improving the query efficiency. Both [49] and
[2] divide the image according to some coarse grid, perform local search in this
lower dimensional space allowing componentwise changes only of − and , then
refine the grid and repeat the scheme. In [2] such a procedure is motivated as an
estimation of the gradient signs. Recently, [39] proposed several attacks based
on evolutionary algorithms, using discrete and continuous optimization, achiev-
ing nearly state-of-the-art query efficiency for the l∞-norm. In order to reduce
the dimensionality of the search space, they use the “tiling trick” of [31] where
they divide the perturbation into a set of squares and modify the values in these
squares with evolutionary algorithms. A related idea also appeared earlier in
[25] where they introduced black rectangle-shaped perturbations for generating
adversarial occlusions. In [39], as in [31], both size and position of the squares
are fixed at the beginning and not optimized. Despite their effectiveness for the
l∞-norm, these discrete optimization based attacks are not straightforward to
adapt to the l2-norm. Finally, approaches based on Bayesian optimization exist,
e.g. [50], but show competitive performance only in a low-query regime.
Different threat and knowledge models. We focus on lp-norm-bounded
adversarial perturbations (for other perturbations such as rotations, translations,
occlusions in the black-box setting see, e.g., [25]). Perturbations with minimal
lp-norm are considered in [15,55] but require significantly more queries than
norm-bounded ones. Thus we do not compare to them, except for [28] which has
competitive query efficiency while aiming at small perturbations.
In other cases the attacker has a different knowledge of the classifier. A more
restrictive scenario, considered by decision-based attacks [9,16,27,11,13], is when
the attacker can query only the decision of the classifier, but not the predicted
scores. Other works use more permissive threat models, e.g., when the attacker
already has a substitute model similar to the target one [44,57,17,23,52] and thus
can generate adversarial examples for the substitute model and then transfer
them to the target model. Related to this, [57] suggest to refine this approach
by running a black-box gradient estimation attack in a subspace spanned by the
gradients of substitute models. However, the gain in query efficiency given by
such extra knowledge does not account for the computational cost required to
train the substitute models, particularly high on ImageNet-scale. Finally, [35] use
extra information on the target data distribution to train a model that predicts
adversarial images that are then refined by gradient estimation attacks.
3 Square Attack
In the following we recall the definitions of the adversarial examples in the threat
model we consider and present our black-box attacks for the l∞- and l2-norms.
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Algorithm 1: The Square Attack via random search
Input: classifier f , point x ∈ Rd, image size w, number of color channels c,
lp-radius , label y ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, number of iterations N
Output: approximate minimizer xˆ ∈ Rd of the problem stated in Eq. (1)
1 xˆ← init(x), l∗ ← L(f(x), y), i← 1
2 while i < N and xˆ is not adversarial do
3 h(i) ← side length of the square to modify (according to some schedule)
4 δ ∼ P (, h(i), w, c, xˆ, x) (see Alg. 2 and 3 for the sampling distributions)
5 xˆnew ← Project xˆ+ δ onto {z ∈ Rd : ‖z − x‖p ≤ } ∩ [0, 1]d
6 lnew ← L(f(xˆnew), y)
7 if lnew < l
∗ then xˆ← xˆnew, l∗ ← lnew ;
8 i← i+ 1
9 end
3.1 Adversarial Examples in the lp-threat Model
Let f : [0, 1]d → RK be a classifier, where d is the input dimension, K the
number of classes and fk(x) is the predicted score that x belongs to class k. The
classifier assigns class arg max
k=1,...,K
fk(x) to the input x. The goal of an untargeted
attack is to change the correctly predicted class y for the point x. A point xˆ is
called an adversarial example with an lp-norm bound of  for x if
arg max
k=1,...,K
fk(xˆ) 6= y, ‖xˆ− x‖p ≤  and xˆ ∈ [0, 1]d,
where we have added the additional constraint that xˆ is an image. The task of
finding xˆ can be rephrased as solving the constrained optimization problem
min
xˆ∈[0,1]d
L(f(xˆ), y), s.t. ‖xˆ− x‖p ≤ , (1)
for a loss L. In our experiments, we use L(f(xˆ), y) = fy(xˆ)−maxk 6=y fk(xˆ).
The goal of targeted attacks is instead to change the decision of the classifier
to a particular class t, i.e., to find xˆ so that arg maxk fk(xˆ) = t under the same
constraints on xˆ. We further discuss the targeted attacks in Sup. E.1.
3.2 General Algorithmic Scheme of the Square Attack
Square Attack is based on random search which is a well known iterative tech-
nique in optimization introduced by Rastrigin in 1963 [46]. The main idea of
the algorithm is to sample a random update δ at each iteration, and to add this
update to the current iterate xˆ if it improves the objective function. Despite its
simplicity, random search performs well in many situations [60] and does not
depend on gradient information from the objective function g.
Many variants of random search have been introduced [38,48,47], which differ
mainly in how the random perturbation is chosen at each iteration (the original
Square Attack: a query-efficient black-box adversarial attack 5
scheme samples uniformly on a hypersphere of fixed radius). For our goal of craft-
ing adversarial examples we come up with two sampling distributions specific to
the l∞- and the l2-attack (Sec. 3.3 and Sec. 3.4), which we integrate in the classic
random search procedure. These sampling distributions are motivated by both
how images are processed by neural networks with convolutional filters and the
shape of the lp-balls for different p. Additionally, since the considered objective
is non-convex when using neural networks, a good initialization is particularly
important. We then introduce a specific one for better query efficiency.
Our proposed scheme differs from classical random search by the fact that
the perturbations xˆ − x are constructed such that for every iteration they lie
on the boundary of the l∞- or l2-ball before projection onto the image domain
[0, 1]d. Thus we are using the perturbation budget almost maximally at each step.
Moreover, the changes are localized in the image in the sense that at each step
we modify just a small fraction of contiguous pixels shaped into squares. Our
overall scheme is presented in Algorithm 1. First, the algorithm picks the side
length h(i) of the square to be modified (step 3), which is decreasing according
to an a priori fixed schedule. This is in analogy to the step-size reduction in
gradient-based optimization. Then in step 4 we sample a new update δ and add
it to the current iterate (step 5). If the resulting loss (obtained in step 6) is
smaller than the best loss so far, the change is accepted otherwise discarded.
Since we are interested in query efficiency, the algorithm stops as soon as an
adversarial example is found. The time complexity of the algorithm is dominated
by the evaluation of f(xˆnew), which is performed at most N times, with N total
number of iterations. We plot the resulting adversarial perturbations in Fig. 3
and additionally in Sup. E where we also show imperceptible perturbations.
We note that previous works [31,49,39] generate perturbations containing
squares. However, while those use a fixed grid on which the squares are con-
strained, we optimize the position of the squares as well as the color, making our
attack more flexible and effective. Moreover, unlike previous works, we motivate
squared perturbations with the structure of the convolutional filters (see Sec. 4).
Size of the squares. Given images of size w×w, let p ∈ [0, 1] be the percent-
age of elements of x to be modified. The length h of the side of the squares used
is given by the closest positive integer to
√
p · w2 (and h ≥ 3 for the l2-attack).
Then, the initial p is the only free parameter of our scheme. With N = 10000
iterations available, we halve the value of p at i ∈ {10, 50, 200, 1000, 2000, 4000,
6000, 8000} iterations. For different N we rescale the schedule accordingly.
3.3 The l∞-Square Attack
Initialization. As initialization we use vertical stripes of width one where the
color of each stripe is sampled uniformly at random from {−, }c (c number of
color channels). We found that convolutional networks are particularly sensitive
to such perturbations, see also [58] for a detailed discussion on the sensitivity of
neural networks to various types of high frequency perturbations.
Sampling distribution. Similar to [49] we observe that successful l∞-
perturbations usually have values ± in all the components (note that this does
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not hold perfectly due to the image constraints xˆ ∈ [0, 1]d). In particular, it holds
xˆi ∈ {max{0, xi − },min{1, xi + }}.
Algorithm 2: Sampling distribution
P for l∞-norm
Input: maximal norm , window
size h, image size w, color
channels c
Output: New update δ
1 δ ← array of zeros of size w × w × c
2 sample uniformly
r, s ∈ {0, . . . , w − h} ⊂ N
3 for i = 1, . . . , c do
4 ρ← Uniform({−2, 2})
5 δr+1:r+h, s+1:s+h, i ← ρ · 1h×h
6 end
Our sampling distribution P for
the l∞-norm described in Algo-
rithm 2 selects sparse updates of
xˆ with ‖δ‖0 = h · h · c where δ ∈
{−2, 0, 2}d and the non-zero ele-
ments are grouped to form a square.
In this way, after the projection
onto the l∞-ball of radius  (Step
5 of Algorithm 1) all components
i for which  ≤ xi ≤ 1 −  satisfy
xˆi ∈ {xi − , xi + }, i.e. differ from
the original point x in each element
either by  or −. Thus xˆ−x is situ-
ated at one of the corners of the l∞-
ball (modulo the components which
are close to the boundary). Note that all projections are done by clipping. More-
over, we fix the elements of δ belonging to the same color channel to have the
same sign, since we observed that neural networks are particularly sensitive to
such perturbations (see Sec. 4.3).
3.4 The l2-Square Attack
Fig. 2. Perturbation of the l2-attack
Initialization. The l2-perturbation
is initialized by generating a 5 × 5
grid-like tiling by squares of the im-
age, where the perturbation on each
tile has the shape described next in
the sampling distribution. The result-
ing perturbation xˆ − x is rescaled to
have l2-norm  and the resulting xˆ is
projected onto [0, 1]d by clipping.
Sampling distribution. First, let us notice that the adversarial perturba-
tions typically found for the l2-norm tend to be much more localized than those
for the l∞-norm [54], in the sense that large changes are applied on some pixels
of the original image, while many others are minimally modified. To mimic this
feature we introduce a new update η which has two “centers” with large absolute
value and opposite signs, while the other components have lower absolute values
as one gets farther away from the centers, but never reaching zero (see Fig. 2
for one example with h = 8 of the resulting update η). In this way the modifica-
tions are localized and with high contrast between the different halves, which we
found to improve the query efficiency. Concretely, we define η(h1,h2) ∈ Rh1×h2
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Algorithm 3: Sampling distribution P for l2-norm
Input: maximal norm , window size h, image size w, number of color channels
c, current image xˆ, original image x
Output: New update δ
1 ν ← xˆ− x
2 sample uniformly r1, s1, r2, s2 ∈ {0, . . . , w − h}
3 W1 := r1 + 1 : r1 + h, s1 + 1 : s1 + h, W2 := r2 + 1 : r2 + h, s2 + 1 : s2 + h
4 2unused ← 2 − ‖ν‖22, η∗ ← η/‖η‖2 with η as in (2)
5 for i = 1, . . . , c do
6 ρ← Uniform({−1, 1})
7 νtemp ← ρη∗ + νW1,i/‖νW1,i‖2
8 iavail ←
√
‖νW1∪W2,i‖22 + 2unused/c
9 νW2,i ← 0, νW1,i ← (νtemp/‖νtemp‖2)iavail
10 end
11 δ ← x+ ν − xˆ
original l∞-attack - ∞ = 0.05 l2-attack - 2 = 5
Fig. 3. Visualization of the adversarial perturbations and examples found by the l∞-
and l2-versions of the Square Attack on ResNet-50
(for some h1, h2 ∈ N+ such that h1 ≥ h2) for every 1 ≤ r ≤ h1, 1 ≤ s ≤ h2 as
η(h1,h2)r,s =
M(r,s)∑
k=0
1
(n+ 1− k)2 , with n =
⌊
h1
2
⌋
,
and M(r, s) = n−max{|r− ⌊h12 ⌋− 1|, |s− ⌊h22 ⌋− 1|}. The intermediate square
update η ∈ Rh×h is then selected uniformly at random from either
η =
(
η(h,k),−η(h,h−k)
)
, with k = bh/2c , (2)
or its transpose (corresponding to a rotation of 90◦).
Second, unlike l∞-constraints, l2-constraints do not allow to perturb each
component independently from the others as the overall l2-norm must be kept
smaller than . Therefore, to modify a perturbation xˆ−x of norm  with localized
changes while staying on the hypersphere, we have to “move the mass” of xˆ− x
from one location to another. Thus, our scheme consists in randomly selecting
two squared windows in the current perturbation ν = xˆ − x, namely νW1 and
νW2 , setting νW2 = 0 and using the budget of ‖νW2‖2 to increase the total
perturbation of νW1 . Note that the perturbation of W1 is then a combination of
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the existing perturbation plus the new generated η. We report the details of this
scheme in Algorithm 3 where step 4 allows to utilize the budget of l2-norm lost
after the projection onto [0, 1]d. The update δ output by the algorithm is such
that the next iterate xˆnew = xˆ + δ (before projection onto [0, 1]
d by clipping)
belongs to the hypersphere B2(x, ) as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let δ be the output of Algorithm 3. Then ‖xˆ+ δ − x‖2 = .
4 Theoretical and Empirical Justification of the Method
We provide high-level theoretical justifications and empirical evidence regarding
the algorithmic choices in Square Attack, with focus on the l∞-version (the l2-
version is significantly harder to analyze).
4.1 Convergence Analysis of Random Search
First, we want to study the convergence of the random search algorithm when
considering an L-smooth objective function g (such as neural networks with ac-
tivation functions like softplus, swish, ELU, etc) on the whole space Rd (without
projection4) under the following assumptions on the update δt drawn from the
sampling distribution Pt:
E‖δt‖22 ≤ γ2tC and E|〈δt, v〉| ≥ C˜γt‖v‖2, ∀v ∈ Rd, (3)
where γt is the step size at iteration t, C, C˜ > 0 some constants and 〈·, ·〉 denotes
the inner product. We obtain the following result, similar to existing convergence
rates for zeroth-order methods [42,43,24]:
Proposition 2. Suppose that E[δt] = 0 and the assumptions in Eq. (3) hold.
Then for step-sizes γt = γ/
√
T , we have
min
t=0,...,T
E‖∇g(xt)‖2≤ 2
γC˜
√
T
(
g(x0)− Eg(xT+1) + γ
2CL
2
)
.
This basically shows for T large enough one can make the gradient arbitrary
small, meaning that the random search algorithm converges to a critical point of
g (one cannot hope for much stronger results in non-convex optimization without
stronger conditions).
Unfortunately, the second assumption in Eq. (3) does not directly hold for
our sampling distribution P for the l∞-norm (see Sup. A.3), but holds for a
similar one, Pmultiple, where each component of the update δ is drawn uniformly
at random from {−2, 2}. In fact we show in Sup. A.4, using the Khintchine
inequality [29], that
E‖δt‖22 ≤ 4cε2h2 and E|〈δt, v〉| ≥
√
2cεh2
d
‖v‖2, ∀v ∈ Rd.
Moreover, while Pmultiple performs worse than the distribution used in Algo-
rithm 2, we show in Sec. 4.3 that it already reaches state-of-the-art results.
4 Nonconvex constrained optimization under noisy oracles is notoriously harder [22].
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4.2 Why Squares?
Previous works [49,39] build their l∞-attacks by iteratively adding square mod-
ifications. Likewise we change square-shaped regions of the image for both our
l∞- and l2-attacks—with the difference that we can sample any square subset
of the input, while the grid of the possible squares is fixed in [49,39]. This leads
naturally to wonder why squares are superior to other shapes, e.g. rectangles.
Let us consider the l∞-threat model, with bound , input space Rd×d and a
convolutional filter w ∈ Rs×s with entries unknown to the attacker. Let δ ∈ Rd×d
be the sparse update with ‖δ‖0 = k ≥ s2 and ‖δ‖∞ ≤ . We denote by S(a, b)
the index set of the rectangular support of δ with |S(a, b)| = k and shape a× b.
We want to provide intuition why sparse square-shaped updates are superior to
rectangular ones in the sense of reaching a maximal change in the activations of
the first convolutional layer.
Let z = δ ∗ w ∈ Rd×d denote the output of the convolutional layer for
the update δ. The l∞-norm of z is the maximal componentwise change of the
convolutional layer:
‖z‖∞ = maxu,v |zu,v| = maxu,v
∣∣∣ s∑
i,j=1
δu−b s2 c+i,v−b s2 c+j · wi,j
∣∣∣
≤ max
u,v

∑
i,j
|wi,j |1(u−b s2 c+i,v−b s2 c+j)∈S(a,b),
where elements with indices exceeding the size of the matrix are set to zero. Note
that the indicator function attains 1 only for the non-zero elements of δ involved
in the convolution to get zu,v. Thus, to have the largest upper bound possible
on |zu,v|, for some (u, v), we need the largest possible amount of components of
δ with indices in
C(u, v) =
{
(u− bs
2
c+ i, v − bs
2
c+ j) : i, j = 1, . . . , s
}
to be non-zero (that is in S(a, b)).
Therefore, it is desirable to have the shape S(a, b) of the perturbation δ
selected so to maximize the number N of convolutional filters w ∈ Rs×s which
fit into the rectangle a×b. Let F be the family of the objects that can be defined
as the union of axis-aligned rectangles with vertices on N2, and G ⊂ F be the
squares of F of shape s× s with s ≥ 2. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Among the elements of F with area k ≥ s2, those which contain
the largest number of elements of G have
N∗ = (a− s+ 1)(b− s+ 1) + (r − s+ 1)+ (4)
of them, with a =
⌊√
k
⌋
, b =
⌊
k
a
⌋
, r = k − ab and z+ = max{z, 0}.
This proposition states that, if we can modify only k elements of δ, then shaping
them to form (approximately) a square allows to maximize the number of pairs
(u, v) for which |S(a, b) ∩C(u, v)| = s2. If k = l2 then a = b = l are the optimal
values for the shape of the perturbation update, i.e. the shape is exactly a square.
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Table 1. Ablation study of the l∞-Square Attack which shows how the individual
design decisions improve the performance. The fourth row corresponds to the method
for which we have shown convergence guarantees in Sec. 4.1. The last row corresponds
to our final l∞-attack. c indicates the number of color channels, h the length of the
side of the squares, so that “# random sign” c represents updates with constant sign
for each color, while c · h2 updates with signs sampled independently of each other
Update # random
Initialization
Failure Avg. Median
shape signs rate queries queries
random c · h2 vert. stripes 0.0% 401 48
random c · h2 uniform rand. 0.0% 393 132
random c vert. stripes 0.0% 339 53
square c · h2 vert. stripes 0.0% 153 15
rectangle c vert. stripes 0.0% 93 16
square c uniform rand. 0.0% 91 26
square c vert. stripes 0.0% 73 11
4.3 Ablation Study
We perform an ablation study to show how the individual design decisions for
the sampling distribution of the random search improve the performance of l∞-
Square Attack, confirming the theoretical arguments above. The comparison is
done for an l∞-threat model of radius  = 0.05 on 1, 000 test points for a ResNet-
50 model trained normally on ImageNet (see Sec. 5 for details) with a query limit
of 10, 000 and results are shown in Table 1. Our sampling distribution is special
in two aspects: i) we use localized update shapes in form of squares and ii)
the update is constant in each color channel. First, one can observe that our
update shape “square” performs better than “rectangle” as we discussed in the
previous section, and it is significantly better than “random” (the same amount
of pixels is perturbed, but selected randomly in the image). This holds both for
c (constant sign per color channel) and c · h2 (every pixel and color channel is
changed independently of each other), with an improvement in terms of average
queries of 339 to 73 and 401 to 153 respectively. Moreover, with updates of
the same shape, the constant sign over color channels is better than selecting
it uniformly at random (improvement in average queries: 401 to 339 and 153
to 73). In total the algorithm with “square-c” needs more than 5× less average
queries than “random-c · h2”, showing that our sampling distribution is the key
to the high query efficiency of Square Attack.
The last innovation of our random search scheme is the initialization, crucial
element of every non-convex optimization algorithm. Our method (“square-c”)
with the vertical stripes initialization improves over a uniform initialization on
average by ≈ 25% and, especially, median number of queries (more than halved).
We want to also highlight that the sampling distribution “square-c · h2” for
which we shown convergence guarantees in Sec. 4.1 performs already better in
terms of the success rate and the median number of queries than the state of the
art (see Sec. 5). For a more detailed ablation, also for our l2-attack, see Sup. C.
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Table 2. Results of untargeted attacks on ImageNet with a limit of 10,000 queries.
For the l∞-attack we set the norm bound  = 0.05 and for the l2-attack  = 5. Models:
normally trained I: Inception v3, R: ResNet-50, V: VGG-16-BN. The Square Attack
outperforms for both threat models all other methods in terms of success rate and
query efficiency. The missing entries correspond to the results taken from the original
paper where some models were not reported
Norm Attack
Failure rate Avg. queries Med. queries
I R V I R V I R V
l∞
Bandits [31] 3.4% 1.4% 2.0% 957 727 394 218 136 36
Parsimonious [49] 1.5% - - 722 - - 237 - -
DFOc–CMA [39] 0.8% 0.0% 0.1% 630 270 219 259 143 107
DFOd–Diag. CMA [39] 2.3% 1.2% 0.5% 424 417 211 20 20 2
SignHunter [2] 1.0% 0.1% 0.3% 471 129 95 95 39 43
Square Attack 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 197 73 31 24 11 1
l2
Bandits [31] 9.8% 6.8% 10.2% 1486 939 511 660 392 196
SimBA-DCT [28] 35.5% 12.7% 7.9% 651 582 452 564 467 360
Square Attack 7.1% 0.7% 0.8% 1100 616 377 385 170 109
5 Experiments
In this section we show the effectiveness of the Square Attack. Here we concen-
trate on untargeted attacks since our primary goal is query efficient robustness
evaluation, while the targeted attacks are postponed to the supplement. First,
we follow the standard setup [31,39] of comparing black-box attacks on three
ImageNet models in terms of success rate and query efficiency for the l∞- and
l2-untargeted attacks (Sec. 5.1). Second, we show that our black-box attack can
even outperform white-box PGD attacks on several models (Sec. 5.2). Finally, in
the supplement we provide more experimental details (Sup. B), a stability study
of our attack for different parameters (Sup. C) and random seeds (Sup. D), and
additional results including the experiments for targeted attacks (Sup. E).
5.1 Evaluation on ImageNet
We compare the Square Attack to state-of-the-art score-based black-box attacks
(without any extra information such as surrogate models) on three pretrained
models in PyTorch (Inception v3, ResNet-50, VGG-16-BN) using 1,000 images
from the ImageNet validation set. Unless mentioned otherwise, we use the code
from the other papers with their suggested parameters. As it is standard in the
literature, we give a budget of 10,000 queries per point to find an adversarial
perturbation of lp-norm at most . We report the average and median number of
queries each attack requires to craft an adversarial example, together with the
failure rate. All query statistics are computed only for successful attacks on the
points which were originally correctly classified.
Tables 2 and 3 show that the Square Attack, despite its simplicity, achieves
in all the cases (models and norms) the lowest failure rate, (< 1% everywhere
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Inception v3 ResNet-50 VGG-16-BN
l∞ attacks
low query regime
l2-attacks
low query regime
Fig. 4. Success rate in the low-query regime (up to 200 queries). ∗ denotes the results
obtained via personal communication with the authors and evaluated on 500 and 10,000
randomly sampled points for BayesAttack [50] and DFO [39] methods, respectively
except for the l2-attack on Inception v3), and almost always requires fewer
queries than the competitors to succeed. Fig. 4 shows the progression of the
success rate of the attacks over the first 200 queries. Even in the low query
regime the Square Attack outperforms the competitors for both norms. Finally,
we highlight that the only hyperparameter of our attack, p, regulating the size of
the squares, is set for all the models to 0.05 for l∞ and 0.1 for l2-perturbations.
l∞-attacks. We compare our attack to Bandits [32], Parsimonious [49], DFOc
/ DFOd [39], and SignHunter [2]. In Table 2 we report the results of the l∞-
attacks with norm bound of  = 0.05. The Square Attack always has the lowest
failure rate, notably 0.0% in 2 out of 3 cases, and the lowest query consumption.
Interestingly, our attack has median equal 1 on VGG-16-BN, meaning that the
proposed initialization is particularly effective for this model.
Table 3.Query statistics for untargeted l2-attacks com-
puted for the points for which all three attacks are suc-
cessful for fair comparison
Attack
Avg. queries Med. queries
I R V I R V
Bandits [31] 536 635 398 368 314 177
SimBA-DCT [28] 647 563 421 552 446 332
Square Attack 352 287 217 181 116 80
The closest competi-
tor in terms of the av-
erage number of queries
is SignHunter [2], which
still needs on average be-
tween 1.8 and 3 times
more queries to find adver-
sarial examples and has a
higher failure rate than our attack. Moreover, the median number of queries of
SignHunter is much worse than for our method (e.g. 43 vs 1 on VGG). We note
that although DFOc–CMA [39] is competitive to our attack in terms of median
queries, it has a significantly higher failure rate and between 2 and 7 times worse
average number of queries. Additionally, our method is also more effective in the
low-query regime (Fig. 4) than other methods (including [50]) on all the models.
l2-attacks. We compare our attack to Bandits [31] and SimBA [28] for  = 5,
while we do not consider SignHunter [2] since it is not as competitive as for the
l∞-norm, and in particular worse than Bandits on ImageNet (see Fig. 2 in [2]).
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As Table 2 and Fig. 4 show, the Square Attack outperforms by a large mar-
gin the other methods in terms of failure rate, and achieves the lowest median
number of queries for all the models and the lowest average one for VGG-16-BN.
However, since it has a significantly lower failure rate, the statistics of the Square
Attack are biased by the “hard” cases where the competitors fail. Then, we re-
compute the same statistics considering only the points where all the attacks
are successful (Table 3). In this case, our method improves by at least 1.5× the
average and by at least 2× the median number of queries.
5.2 Square Attack Can be More Accurate than White-box Attacks
Table 4.On the robust models of [37] and
[61] on MNIST l∞-Square Attack with
 = 0.3 achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA)
results outperforming white-box attacks
Model
Robust accuracy
SOTA Square
Madry et al. [37] 88.13% 88.25%
TRADES [61] 93.33% 92.58%
Here we test our attack on problems
which are challenging for both white-
box PGD and other black-box attacks.
We use for evaluation robust accuracy,
defined as the worst-case accuracy of a
classifier when an attack perturbs each
input in some lp-ball. We show that our
algorithm outperforms the competitors
both on state-of-the-art robust models and defenses that induce different types
of gradient masking. Thus, our attack is useful to evaluate robustness without
introducing adaptive attacks designed for each model separately.
Outperforming white-box attacks on robust models. The models ob-
tained with the adversarial training of [37] and TRADES [61] are standard
benchmarks to test adversarial attacks, which means that many papers have
tried to reduce their robust accuracy, without limit on the computational bud-
get and primarily via white-box attacks. We test our l∞-Square Attack on these
robust models on MNIST at  = 0.3, using p = 0.8, 20k queries and 50 random
restarts, i.e., we run our attack 50 times and consider it successful if any of the
runs finds an adversarial example (Table 4). On the model of Madry et al [37]
Square Attack is only 0.12% far from the white-box state-of-the-art, achieving
the second best result (also outperforming the 91.47% of SignHunter [2] by a
large margin). On the TRADES benchmark [63], our method obtains a new
SOTA of 92.58% robust accuracy outperforming the white-box attack of [20].
Additionally, the subsequent work of [21] uses the Square Attack as part of their
AutoAttack where they show that the Square Attack outperforms other white-
box attacks on 9 out of 9 MNIST models they evaluated. Thus, our black-box
attack can be also useful for robustness evaluation of new defenses in the setting
where gradient-based attacks require many restarts and iterations.
Resistance to gradient masking. In Table 5 we report the robust accuracy
at different thresholds  of the l∞-adversarially trained models on MNIST of [37]
for the l2-threat model. It is known that the PGD is ineffective since it suffers
from gradient masking [53]. Unlike PGD and other black-box attacks, our Square
Attack does not suffer from gradient masking and yields robust accuracy close to
zero for  = 2.5, with only a single run. Moreover, the l2-version of SignHunter [2]
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Table 5. l2-robustness of the l∞-adversarially trained models of [37] at different
thresholds . PGD is shown with 1, 10, 100 random restarts. The black-box attacks are
given a 10k queries budget (see the supplement for details)
2
Robust accuracy
White-box Black-box
PGD1 PGD10 PGD100 SignHunter Bandits SimBA Square
2.0 79.6% 67.4% 59.8% 95.9% 80.1% 87.6% 16.7%
2.5 69.2% 51.3% 36.0% 94.9% 32.4% 75.8% 2.4%
3.0 57.6% 29.8% 12.7% 93.8% 12.5% 58.1% 0.6%
Table 6. l∞-robustness of Clean Logit Pairing (CLP), Logit Squeezing (LSQ) [33].
The Square Attack is competitive to white-box PGD with many restarts (R=10,000,
R=100 on MNIST, CIFAR-10 resp.) and more effective than black-box attacks [31,2]
∞ Model
Robust accuracy
White-box Black-box
PGD1 PGDR Bandits SignHunter Square
0.3
CLPMNIST 62.4% 4.1% 33.3% 62.1% 6.1%
LSQMNIST 70.6% 5.0% 37.3% 65.7% 2.6%
16/255
CLPCIFAR 2.8% 0.0% 14.3% 0.1% 0.2%
LSQCIFAR 27.0% 1.7% 27.7% 13.2% 7.2%
fails to accurately assess the robustness because the method optimizes only over
the extreme points of the l∞-ball of radius /
√
d embedded in the target l2-ball.
Attacking Clean Logit Pairing and Logit Squeezing. These two l∞
defenses proposed in [33] were broken in [40]. However, [40] needed up to 10k
restarts of PGD which is computationally prohibitive. Using the publicly avail-
able models from [40], we run the Square Attack with p = 0.3 and 20k query
limit (results in Table 6). We obtain robust accuracy similar to PGDR in most
cases, but with a single run, i.e. without additional restarts. At the same time,
although on some models Bandits and SignHunter outperform PGD1, they on
average achieve significantly worse results than the Square Attack. This again
shows the utility of the Square Attack to accurately assess robustness.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a simple black-box attack which outperforms by a large mar-
gin the state-of-the-art both in terms of query efficiency and success rate. Our
results suggest that our attack is useful even in comparison to white-box attacks
to better estimate the robustness of models that exhibit gradient masking.
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Supplementary Material
Organization of the Supplementary Material
In Section A, we present the missing proofs of Section 3 and Section 4 and slightly
deepen our theoretical insights on the efficiency of the proposed l∞-attack. Sec-
tion B covers various implementation details and the hyperparameters we used.
We show a more detailed ablation study on different choices of the attack’s algo-
rithm in Section C. Since the Square Attack is a randomized algorithm, we show
the variance of the main reported metric for different random seeds in Section D.
Finally, Section E presents results of the targeted attacks on ImageNet, addi-
tional results for the untargeted attacks, and an evaluation of the post-averaging
defense [36] which we conclude is much less robust than claimed.
A Proofs Omitted from Section 3 and Section 4
In this section, we present the proofs omitted from Section 3 and Section 4.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let δ be the output of Algorithm 3. We prove here that ‖xˆ+ δ − x‖2 = .
From Step 13 of Algorithm 3, we directly have the equality ‖xˆ+ δ − x‖2 =
‖ν‖2. Let νold be the update at the previous iteration, defined in Step 1 and
W1 ∪W2 the indices not belonging to W1 ∪W2. Then,
‖ν‖22 =
c∑
i=1
‖νW1∪W2,i‖22 +
c∑
i=1
∥∥∥νW1∪W2,i∥∥∥22
=
c∑
i=1
‖νW1,i‖22 +
c∑
i=1
∥∥∥νW1∪W2,i∥∥∥22
=
c∑
i=1
(iavail)
2 +
c∑
i=1
∥∥∥νW1∪W2,i∥∥∥22
=
c∑
i=1
∥∥νoldW1∪W2,i∥∥22 + 2unused + c∑
i=1
∥∥∥νW1∪W2,i∥∥∥22
(i)
=
c∑
i=1
∥∥νoldW1∪W2,i∥∥22 + 2unused + c∑
i=1
∥∥∥νoldW1∪W2,i∥∥∥22
=
∥∥νold∥∥2
2
+ 2unused
(ii)
= 2,
where (i) holds since νold
W1∪W2 ≡ νW1∪W2 as the modifications affect only the
elements in the two windows, and (ii) holds by the definition of unused in Step
4 of Algorithm 3.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Using the L-smoothness of the function g, that is it holds for all x, y ∈ Rd,
‖∇g(x)−∇g(y)‖2 ≤ L ‖x− y‖2 .
we obtain (see e.g. [8]):
g(xt + δt) ≤ g(xt) + 〈∇g(xt), δt〉+ L
2
‖δt‖22,
and by definition of xt+1 we have
g(xt+1) ≤ min{g(xt), g(xt + δt)}
≤ g(xt) + min{0, 〈∇g(xt), δt〉+ L
2
‖δt‖22}.
Using the definition of the min as a function of the absolute value (2 min{a, b} =
a+ b− |a− b|) yields
g(xt+1) ≤ g(xt) + 1
2
〈∇g(xt), δt〉+ L
4
‖δt‖22 −
1
2
|〈∇g(xt), δt〉+ L
2
‖δt‖22|.
And using the triangular inequality (|a+ b| ≥ |a| − |b|), we have
g(xt+1) ≤ g(xt) + 1
2
〈∇g(xt), δt〉+ L
2
‖δt‖22 −
1
2
|〈∇g(xt), δt〉|.
Therefore taking the expectation and using that Eδt = 0, we get
Eg(xt+1) ≤ Eg(xt)− 1
2
E|〈∇g(xt), δt〉|+ L
2
E‖δt‖22.
Therefore, together with the assumptions in Eq. (3) this yields to
Eg(xt+1) ≤ Eg(xt)− C˜γt
2
E‖∇g(xt)‖2 + LCγ
2
t
2
.
and thus
E ‖∇g(xt)‖2 ≤
2
γtC˜
(
Eg(xt)− Eg(xt+1) + LCγ
2
t
2
)
.
Thus for γt = γ we have summing for t = 0 : T
min
0≤i≤T
E‖∇g(xi)‖2 ≤ 1
T
T∑
t=0
E‖∇g(xt)‖2
≤ 2
C˜γT
[
g(x0)− Eg(xT+1) + TLCγ
2
2
]
.
We conclude setting the step-size to γ = Θ(1/
√
T ).
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A.3 Assumptions in Eq. (3) Do Not Hold for the Sampling
Distribution P
Let us consider an update δ with a window size h = 2 and the direction v ∈
{−1, 1}w×w×c defined as
vik,l = (−1)kl for all i, k, l.
It is easy to check that any update δ drawn from the sampling distribution P is
orthogonal to this direction v:
〈v, δ〉 =
c∑
i=1
r+2∑
k=r+1
s+2∑
l=s+1
(−1)kl = c(−1 + 1− 1 + 1) = 0.
Thus, E|〈v, δ〉| = 0 and the assumptions in Eq. (3) do not hold. This means that
the convergence analysis does not directly hold for the sampling distribution P .
A.4 Assumptions in Eq. (3) Hold for the Sampling Distribution
Pmultiple
Let us consider the sampling distribution Pmultiple where different Rademacher
ρk,l,i are drawn for each pixel of the update window δr+1:r+h, s+1:s+h, i. We
present it in Algorithm 4 with the convention that any subscript k > w should
be understood as k − w. This technical modification is greatly helpful to avoid
side effect.
Let v ∈ Rw×w×c for which we have using the Khintchine inequality [29]:
Algorithm 4: Sampling distribution Pmultiple for l∞-norm
Input: maximal norm , window size h, image size w, color channels c
Output: New update δ
1 δ ← array of zeros of size w × w × c
2 sample uniformly r, s ∈ {0, . . . , w} ⊂ N
3 for i = 1, . . . , c do
4 δr+1:r+h, s+1:s+h, i ← Uniform({−2, 2}h×h)
5 end
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E|〈δ, v〉| = E|
r+h∑
k=r+1
s+h∑
l=s+1
c∑
i=1
δik,lv
i
k,l|
(i)
= E(r,s)Eρ|
r+h∑
k=r+1
s+h∑
l=s+1
c∑
i=1
δik,lv
i
k,l|
(ii)
≥ 2ε√
2
E(r,s)‖V(r,s)‖2
(iii)
≥
√
2ε‖E(r,s)V(r,s)‖2
≥
√
2εh2
w2
‖v‖2,
where we define by V(r,s) = {vik,l}k∈{r+1,...,r+h},l∈{s+1,...,s+h},i∈{1,...,c} and (i)
follows from the decomposition between the randomness of the Rademacher and
the random window, (ii) follows from the Khintchine inequality and (iii) follows
from Jensen inequality.
In addition we have for the variance:
E‖δ‖22 = E(r,s)
r+h∑
k=r+1
s+h∑
l=s+1
c∑
i=1
Eρ(δik,l)2
= E(r,s)
r+h∑
k=r+1
s+h∑
l=s+1
c∑
i=1
4ε2
= 4cε2h2.
Thus the assumptions in Eq. (3) hold for the sampling distribution Pmultiple.
A.5 Why Updates of Equal Sign?
Proposition 2 underlines the importance of a large inner product E[|〈δt,∇g(xt)〉|]
in the direction of the gradients. This provides some intuition explaining why
the update δsingle, where a single Rademacher is drawn for each window, is more
efficient than the update δmultiple where different Rademacher values are drawn.
Following the observation that the gradients are often approximately piecewise
constant [31], we consider, as a heuristic, a piecewise constant direction v for
which we will show that
E[|〈δsingle, v〉|] = Θ(‖v‖1) and E[|〈δmultiple, v〉|] = Θ(‖v‖2).
Therefore the directions sampled by our proposal are more correlated with the
gradient direction and help the algorithm to converge faster. This is also verified
empirically in our experiments (see the ablation study in Sup. C).
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Analysis. Let us consider the direction v ∈ Rw×w composed of different
blocks {V(r,s)}(r,s)∈{0,...,w/h} of constant sign.
For this direction v we compare two different proposal Pmultiple and P single
where we choose uniformly one random block (r, s) and we either assign a single
Rademacher ρ(r,s) to the whole block (this is P
single) or we assign multiple
Rademacher values {ρ(k,l)}k∈{rh+1,...,(r+1)h},l∈{sh+1,...,(s+1)h} (this is Pmultiple).
Using the Khintchine and Jensen inequalities similarly to Sec. A.4, we have
E|〈δmultiple, v〉| = E|
(r+1)h∑
k=rh+1
(s+1)h∑
l=sh+1
δk,lvk,l|
≥ 2ε√
2
E(r,s)‖V(r,s)‖2
≥
√
2εh2
w2
‖v‖2.
Moreover, we can show the following upper bound using the Khintchine inequal-
ity and the inequality between the l1- and l2-norms:
E|〈δmultiple, v〉| = E|
(r+1)h∑
k=rh+1
(s+1)h∑
l=sh+1
δk,lvk,l|
≤ 2εE(r,s)‖V(r,s)‖2
=
2εh2
w2
w/h∑
r=1
w/h∑
s=1
‖V(r,s)‖2
≤ 2εh
w
‖v‖2
Thus, E[|〈δmultiple, v〉|] = Θ(‖v‖2).
For the update δsingle we obtain
E|〈δsingle, v〉| = E|
(r+1)h∑
k=rh+1
(s+1)h∑
l=sh+1
δr,svk,l|
= E|δr,s
(r+1)h∑
k=rh+1
(s+1)h∑
l=sh+1
vk,l|
(i)
= 2εE(r,s)‖V(r,s)‖1
=
2εh2
w2
‖v‖1
where (i) follows from the fact the V(r,s) has a constant sign. We recover then
the l1-norm of the direction v, i.e. we conclude that E[|〈δsingle, v〉|] = Θ(‖v‖1).
This implies that for an approximately constant block E|〈δsingle, v〉| will be
larger than E|〈δmultiple, v〉|. For example, in the extreme case of constant binary
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block |V(r,s)| = 11>, we have
E|〈δsingle, v〉| = 2εh2 >> E|〈δmultiple, v〉|  2εh.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Let x ∈ F , and N(x) the number of elements of G that x contains. Let initialize x
as a square of size s×s, so that N(x) = 1. We then add iteratively the remaining
k − s2 unitary squares to x so to maximize N(x).
In order to get N(x) = 2 it is necessary to increase x to have size s × (s + 1).
At this point, again to get N(x) = 3 we need to add s squares to one side
of x. However, if we choose to glue them so to form a rectangle s × (s + 2),
then N(x) = 3 and once more we need other s squares to increase N , which
means overall s2 + 3s to achieve N(x) = 4. If instead we glue s squares along
the longer side, with only one additional unitary square we get N(x) = 4 using
s2 + 2s+ 1 < s2 + 3s unitary squares (as s ≥ 2), with x = (s+ 1)× (s+ 1).
Then, if the current shape of x is a× b with a ≥ b, the optimal option is adding
a unitary squares to have shape a× (b+ 1), increasing the count N of a− s+ 1.
This strategy can be repeated until the budget of k unitary squares is reached.
Finally, since we start from the shape s × s, then at each stage b − a ∈ {0, 1},
which means that the final a will be
⌊√
k
⌋
. A rectangle a × b in F contains
(a− s+ 1)(b− s+ 1) elements of G. The remaining k− ab squares can be glued
along the longer side, contributing to N(x) with (k − ab− s+ 1)+.
B Experimental Details
In this section, we list the main hyperparameters and various implementation
details for the experiments done in the main experiments (Sec. 5).
B.1 Experiments on ImageNet
For the untargeted Square Attack on the ImageNet models, we used p = 0.05
and p = 0.1 for the l∞- and l2- versions respectively. For Bandits, we used their
code with their suggested hyperparameters (specified in the configuration files)
for both l∞ and l2. For SignHunter, we used directly their code which does not
have any hyperparameters (assuming that the finite difference probe δ is set to
). For SimBA-DCT, we used the default parameters of the original code apart
from the following, which are the suggested ones for each model: for ResNet-50
and VGG-16-BN “freq dims” = 28, “order” = “strided” and “stride” = 7, for
Inception v3 “freq dims” = 38, “order” = “strided” and “stride” = 9. Notice
that SimBA tries to minimize the l2-norm of the perturbations but it does not
have a bound on the size of the changes. Then we consider it successful when
the adversarial examples produced have norm smaller than the fixed threshold
. The results for all other methods were taken directly from the corresponding
papers.
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Evaluation of Bandits. The code of Bandits [31] does not have image
standardization at the stage where the set of correctly points is determined
(see https://github.com/MadryLab/blackbox-bandits/issues/3). As a re-
sult, the attack is run only on the set of points correctly classified by the network
without standardization, although the network was trained on standardized im-
ages. We fix this bug, and report the results in Table 2 based on the fixed version
of their code. We note that the largest difference of our evaluation compared to
the l∞ results reported in Appendix E of [31] is obtained for the VGG-16-BN net-
work: we get 2.0% failure rate while they reported 8.4% in their paper. Also, we
note that the query count for Inception v3 we obtain is also better than reported
in [31]: 957 instead of 1117 with a slightly better failure rate. Our l2 results also
differ – we obtain a significantly lower failure rate (9.8%, 6.8%, 10.2% instead
of 15.5%, 9.7%, 17.2% for the Inception v3, ResNet-50, VGG-16-BN networks
respectively) with improved average number of queries (1486, 939, 511 instead
of 1858, 993, 594).
B.2 Square Attack Can be More Accurate than White-box Attacks
For the l∞-Square Attack, we used p = 0.3 for all models on MNIST and CIFAR-
10. For Bandits on MNIST and CIFAR-10 adversarially trained models we used
“exploration” = 0.1, “tile size” = 16, “gradient iters” = 1 following [49].
For the comparison of l2-attacks on the l∞-adversarially trained model of
[37] we used the Square Attack with the usual parameter p = 0.1. For Bandits
we used the parameters “exploration” = 0.01, “tile size” = 28, “gradient iters”
= 1, after running a grid search over the three of them (all the other parameters
are kept as set in the original code). For SimBA we used the “pixel attack” with
parameters “order” = “rand”, “freq dims” = 28, step size of 0.50, after a grid
search on all the parameters.
C Ablation Study
Here we discuss in more detail the ablation study which justifies the algorithmic
choices made for our l∞- and l2-attacks. Additionally, we discuss the robustness
of the attack to the hyperparameter p, i.e. the initial fraction of pixels changed
by the attack (see Fig. 5). We perform all these experiments on ImageNet with
a standardly trained ResNet-50 model from the PyTorch repository.
C.1 l∞-Square Attack
Sensitivity to the hyperparameter p. First of all, we note that for all values
of p we achieve 0.0% failure rate. Moreover, we achieve state-of-the-art query
efficiency with all considered values of p (from 0.0125 to 0.4), i.e. we have the
average number of queries below 140, and the median below 20 queries. There-
fore, we conclude that the attack is robust to a wide range of p, which is an
important property of a black-box attack – since the target model is unknown,
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failure rate avg. queries median queries
l∞ -  = 0.05
l2 -  = 5.0
Fig. 5. Sensitivity of the Square Attack to different choices of p ∈
{0.0125, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4}, i.e. the initial fraction of pixels
changed by the attack, on ImageNet for a ResNet-50 model
and one aims at minimizing the number of queries needed to fool the model,
doing even an approximate grid search over p is prohibitively expensive.
Algorithmic choices. In addition to the results presented in Sec. 4.3, we
show in Table 7 the results of a few more variants of the Square Attack. We
recall that “# random signs” indicates how many different signs we sample to
build the updates, with c being the number of color channels and h the current
size of the square-shaped updates. Specifically, we test the performance of using
a single random sign for all the elements for the update, “square-1”, which turns
out to be comparable to “square-c · h2”, i.e. every component of the update has
sign independently sampled, but worse than keeping the sign constant within
each color channel (“square-c”).
In order to implement update shape “rectangle”, on every iteration and for
every image we sample α, β ∼ Exp(1) and take a rectangle with sides α · s
and β · s, so that in expectation its area is equal to s2, i.e. to the area of the
original square. This update scheme performs significantly better than changing
a random subset of pixels (93 vs 339 queries on average), but worse than changing
squares (73 queries on average) as discussed in Sec. 4.2.
Finally, we show the results with two more initialization schemes: horizon-
tal stripes (instead of vertical), as well as initialization with randomly placed
squares. While both solutions lead to the state-of-the-art query efficiency (83
and 90 queries on average) compared to the literature, they achieve worse re-
sults than the vertical stripes we choose for our Square Attack.
C.2 l2-Square Attack
Sensitivity to the hyperparameter p. We observe that the l2-Square At-
tack is robust to different choices in the range between 0.05 and 0.4 showing
approximately the same failure rate and query efficiency for all values of p in
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Table 7. An ablation study for the performance of the l∞- and l2-Square Attack under
various algorithmic choices of the attack. The metrics are calculated on 1,000 ImageNet
images for a ResNet-50 model. The last row represents our recommended setting. For
all experiments we used the best performing p (0.05 for l∞ and 0.1 for l2)
l∞ ablation study
Update # random
Initialization
Failure Avg. Median
shape signs rate queries queries
random c · h2 vert. stripes 0.0% 401 48
random c · h2 uniform rand. 0.0% 393 132
random c vert. stripes 0.0% 339 53
square c · h2 vert. stripes 0.0% 153 15
square 1 vert. stripes 0.0% 129 18
rectangle c vert. stripes 0.0% 93 16
square c uniform rand. 0.0% 91 26
square c rand. squares 0.0% 90 20
square c horiz. stripes 0.0% 83 18
square c vert. stripes 0.0% 73 11
l2 ablation study
Update Initialization
Failure Avg. Median
rate queries queries
ηrand ηrand-grid 3.3% 1050 324
ηsingle ηsingle-grid 0.7% 650 171
η gaussian 0.4% 696 189
η uniform 0.8% 660 187
η vert. stripes 0.8% 655 186
η η-grid 0.7% 616 170
this range, while its performance degrades slightly for very small initial squares
p ∈ {0.0125, 0.025}.
Algorithmic choices. We analyze in Table 7 the sensitivity of the l2-attack
to different choices of the shape of the update and initialization.
In particular, we test an update with only one “center” instead of two, namely
ηsingle = ηh,h (following the notation of Eq. 2) and one, ηrand, where the step 7 in
Algorithm 3 is ρ ← Uniform({−1, 1}h×h) instead of ρ← Uniform({−1, 1}),
which means that each element of η is multiplied randomly by either −1 or 1
independently (instead of all elements multiplied by the same value). We can
see that using different random signs in the update and initialization (ηrand)
significantly (1.5× factor) degrades the results for the l2-attack, which is similar
to the observation made for the l∞-attack.
Alternatively to the grid described in Sec. 3.4, we consider as starting pertur-
bation i) a random point sampled according to Uniform({−/√d, /√d}w×w×c),
that is on the corners of the largest l∞-ball contained in the l2-ball of radius 
(uniform initialization), ii) a random position on the l2-ball of radius  (Gaussian
initialization) or iii) vertical stripes similarly to what done for the l∞-Square At-
tack, but with magnitude /
√
d to fulfill the constraints on the l2-norm of the
Square Attack: a query-efficient black-box adversarial attack 27
Table 8. Mean and standard deviation of the main performance metrics of the Square
Attack across 10 different runs with different random seeds
ImageNet, ResNet-50
Norm  Failure rate Avg. queries Median queries
l∞ 0.05 0.0%± 0.0% 72± 2 11± 1
l2 5 0.6%± 0.1% 638± 12 163± 8
MNIST, adversarially trained LeNet from [37]
Norm  Robust accuracy Avg. queries Median queries
l∞ 0.3 87.0%± 0.1% 299± 47 52± 7
l2 2 16.0%± 1.4% 1454± 71 742± 78
perturbation. We note that different initialization schemes do not have a large
influence on the results of our l2-attack, unlike for the l∞-attack.
D Stability of the Attack under Different Random Seeds
Here we study the stability of the Square Attack over the randomness in the al-
gorithm, i.e. in the initialization, in the choice of the locations of square-shaped
regions, and in the choice of the values in the updates δ. We repeat 10 times
experiments similar to the ones reported in Sec. 5.1 and Sec. 5.2 with different
random seeds for our attack, and report all the metrics with standard deviations
in Table 8. On ImageNet, we evaluate the failure rate (over initially correctly clas-
sified points) and query efficiency on 1,000 images using ResNet-50. On MNIST,
we evaluate the robust accuracy (i.e. the failure rate over all points) and query
efficiency on 1,000 images using the l∞-adversarially trained LeNet from [37].
Note that unlike in Sec. 5.2 in both cases we use a single restart for the attack
on MNIST, and we compute the statistics on 1,000 points instead of 10,000, thus
the final results will differ.
On the ImageNet model, all these metrics are very concentrated for both the
l∞- and the l2-norms. Moreover, we note that the standard deviations are much
smaller than the gap between the Square Attack and the competing methods
reported in Table 2. Thus we conclude that the results of the attack are stable
under different random seeds.
On the adversarially trained MNIST model from [37], the robust accuracy is
very concentrated showing only 0.1% and 1.4% standard deviations for the l∞-
and the l2-norms respectively. Importantly, this is much less than the gaps to the
nearest competitors reported in Tables 4 and 5. We also show query efficiency for
this model, although for models with non-trivial robustness it is more important
to achieve lower robust accuracy, and query efficiency on successful adversarial
examples is secondary. We note that the standard deviation of the mean and
median number of queries is higher than for ImageNet, particularly for the l∞-
ball of radius  = 0.3 where the robust accuracy is much higher than for the
l2-ball of radius  = 2. This is possibly due to the fact that attacking more
28 M. Andriushchenko et al.
robust models (within a certain threat model) is a more challenging task than,
e.g., attacking standardly trained classifiers, as those used on ImageNet, which
means that a favorable random initialization or perturbation updates can have
more influence on the query efficiency.
E Additional Experimental Results
This section contains results on targeted attacks, and also additional results on
untargeted attacks that complement the ImageNet results from Table 2. More-
over, we show that the Square Attack is useful for evaluating the robustness of
newly proposed defenses (see Sec. E.6).
E.1 Targeted Attacks
While in Sec. 5 we considered only untargeted attacks, here we report the results
of the different attacks in the targeted scenario.
Targeted Square Attack. In order to adapt our scheme to targeted attacks,
where one first choose a target class t and then tries to get the model f to classify
a point x as t, we need to modify the loss function L which is minimized (see
Eq. (1)). For the untargeted attacks we used the margin-based loss L(f(x), y) =
fy(x)−maxk 6=y fk(x), with y the correct class of x. This loss could be straight-
forwardly adapted to the targeted case as L(f(x), t) = −ft(x) + maxk 6=t fk(x).
However, in practice we observed that this loss leads to suboptimal query effi-
ciency. We hypothesize that the drawback of the margin-based loss in this setting
is that the maximum over k 6= t is realized by different k at different iterations,
and then the changes applied to the image tend to cancel each other. We ob-
served this effect particularly on ImageNet which has a very high number of
classes.
Instead, we use here as objective function the cross-entropy loss on the target
class, defined as
L(f(x), t) = −ft(x) + log
(
K∑
i=1
efi(x)
)
. (5)
Minimizing L is then equivalent to maximizing the confidence of the classifier in
the target class. Notice that in Eq. (5) the scores of all the classes are involved,
so that it increases the relative weight of the target class respect to the others,
making the targeted attacks more effective.
Experiments. We present the results for targeted attacks on ImageNet for
Inception-v3 model in Table 9. We calculate the statistics on 1,000 images (the
target class is randomly picked for each image) with query limit of 100,000 for l∞
and on 200 points and with query limit 60,000 for l2, as this one is more expensive
computationally because of the lower success rate, with the same norm bounds 
used in the untargeted case. We use the Square Attack with p = 0.01 for l∞ and
p = 0.02 for l2. The results for the competing methods for l∞ are taken from [39],
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Table 9. Results of targeted attacks on ImageNet for Inception-v3 model using 100k
query limit for l∞, 60k for l2. The results for the competing methods for l∞ are taken
from [39], except SignHunter [2] which we evaluated using their code
Norm Attack Failure rate Avg. queries Median queries
l∞
Bandits [31] 7.5% 25341 18053
SignHunter [2] 1.1% 8814 5481
Parsimonious [49] 0.0% 7184 5116
DFOc – Diag. CMA [39] 6.0% 6768 3797
DFOc – CMA [39] 0.0% 6662 4692
Square Attack 0.0% 4584 2859
l2
Bandits [31] 24.5% 20489 17122
SimBA-DCT [28] 25.5% 30576 30180
Square Attack 33.5% 19794 15946
except SignHunter [2] which was not evaluated in the targeted setting before,
thus we performed the evaluation using their code on 100 test points using the
cross-entropy as the loss function. For l2, we use Bandits [31] with the standard
parameters used in the untargeted scenario, while we ran a grid search over the
step size of SimBA (we set it to 0.03) and keep the other hyperparameters as
suggested for the Inception-v3 model.
The targeted l∞-Square Attack achieves 100% success rate and requires 1.5
times fewer queries on average than the nearest competitor [39], showing that
even in the targeted scenario our simple scheme outperforms the state-of-the-art
methods. On the other hand, our l2-attack suffers from worse higher failure rate
than the competitors, but achieves lower average and median number of queries
(although on a different number of successful points).
E.2 Success Rate on ImageNet for Different Number of Queries
In this section, we provide a more detailed comparison to the competitors from
Table 2 under different query budgets and more comments about the low query
regime experiment in Fig. 4. We show in Fig. 6 the behaviour of the success rate
for each attack depending on the number queries. The success rates of the at-
tacks from [39] (DFOc–CMA–50 and DFOd–Diag. CMA–30) and [50] (BayesAt-
tack) for different number of queries were obtained via personal communication
directly from the authors, and were calculated on 500 and 10,000 randomly sam-
pled points, respectively. For the other attacks, as mentioned above, the success
rate is calculated on 1,000 randomly sampled points.
l∞-results. First, we observe that the Square Attack outperforms all other
methods in the standard regime with 10,000 queries. The gap in the success rate
gets larger in the range of 100-1000 queries for the more challenging Inception-v3
model, where we observe over 10% improvement in the success rate over all other
methods including SignHunter. Our method also outperforms the BayesAttack
in the low query regime, i.e. less than 200 queries, by approximately 20% on
every model. We note that DFOd–Diag. CMA–30 method is also quite effective
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Inception v3 ResNet-50 VGG-16-BN
l∞-attacks
l∞-attacks
low query regime
l2-attacks
l2-attacks
low query regime
Fig. 6. Success rate vs number of queries for different attacks on ImageNet on three
standardly trained models. The low query regime corresponds to up to 200 queries,
while the standard regime corresponds to 10,000 queries. ∗ denotes the results ob-
tained via personal communication with the authors and evaluated on 500 and 10,000
randomly sampled points for DFO [39] and BayesAttack [50] methods, respectively
in the low query regime showing results close to BayesAttack. However, it is also
outperformed by our Square Attack.
l2-results. First, since the l2-version of SignHunter [2] is not competitive
to Bandits on ImageNet (see Fig. 2 in [2]), we do not compare to them here.
The l2-Square Attack outperforms both Bandits and SimBA, and the gap is
particularly large in the low query regime. We note that the success rate of
SimBA plateaus after some iteration. This happens due to the fact that their
algorithm only adds orthogonal updates to the perturbation, and does not have
any way to correct the greedy decisions made earlier. Thus, there is no progress
anymore after the norm of the perturbation reaches the  = 5 (note that we
used for SimBA the same parameters of the comparison between SimBA and
Bandits in [28]). Contrary to this, both Bandits and our attack constantly keep
improving the success rate, although with a different speed.
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Table 10. Results of untargeted l∞-perturbations produced by the Square Attack on
architectures with dilated convolutions
∞ Model Failure rate Avg. queries Median queries
0.05
DRN-A-50 0.0% 86 12
DRN-C-42 0.0% 57 7
DRN-D-38 0.0% 48 6
E.3 Performance on Architectures with Dilated Convolutions
In Sec. 4.2, we provided justifications for square-shaped updates for convolu-
tional networks. Thus, a reasonable question is whether the Square Attack still
works equally well on less standard convolutional networks such as, for example,
networks with dilated convolutions. For this purpose, we evaluate three different
architectures introduced in [59] that involve dilated convolutions: DRN-A-50,
DRN-C-42 and DRN-D-38. We use ∞ = 0.05 as in the main ImageNet experi-
ments from Table 2. We present the results in Table 10 and observe that for all
the three model the Square Attack achieves 100% success rate and both average
and median number of queries stay comparable to that of VGG or ResNet-50
from Table 2. Thus, this experiment suggests that our attack can be applied not
only to standard convolutional networks, but also to more recent neural network
architectures.
E.4 Imperceptible Adversarial Examples with the Square Attack
Adversarial examples in general need not be imperceptible, for example adver-
sarial patches [10,34] are clearly visible, and yet can be used to attack machine
learning systems deployed in-the-wild. However, if imperceptibility is the goal, it
can be easily ensured by adjusting the size of the allowed perturbations. In the
main ImageNet experiments in Table 2 we used ∞ = 0.05 = 12.75/255 since
this is standard in the literature [2,31,39,49], and for which all the considered
attacks produce visible perturbations. Below we additionally provide results on
the more than 3× smaller threshold ∞ = 4/255 which leads to imperceptible
perturbations (see Fig. 7). Our attack still achieves almost perfect success rate
requiring only a limited number of queries as shown in Table 11. Thus, one can
also generate imperceptibile adversarial examples with the Square Attack simply
by adjusting the perturbation size.
Table 11. Results of untargeted imperceptible l∞-perturbations produced by the
Square Attack on standard architectures
∞ Model Failure rate Avg. queries Median queries
4/255
VGG 0.5% 424 115
ResNet-50 0.3% 652 213
Inception v3 5.4% 1013 391
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Original image Perturbation Adversarial image
Fig. 7. Visualization of the imperceptible adversarial examples found by the l∞ Square
Attack on ImageNet using ResNet-50 for ∞ = 4/255. All the original images were
correctly classified while the adversarial images are misclassified by the model. The
perturbations are amplified for the visualization purpose
E.5 Analysis of Adversarial Examples that Require More Queries
Here we provide more visualizations of adversarial perturbations generated by
the untargeted Square Attack for  = 0.05 on ImageNet. We analyze here the
inputs that require more queries to be misclassified. We present the results in
Fig. 8 where we plot adversarial examples after 10, 100 and 500 iterations of our
attack. First, we note that a misclassification is achieved when the margin loss
becomes negative. We can observe that the loss decreases gradually over itera-
tions, and a single update only rarely leads to a significant decrease of the loss.
As the attack progresses over iterations, the size of the squares is reduced ac-
cording to our piecewise-constant schedule leading to more refined perturbations
since the algorithm accumulates a larger number of square-shaped updates.
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Fig. 8. Visualization of adversarial examples for which the untargeted l∞ Square At-
tack requires more queries. We visualize adversarial examples and perturbations after
10, 100 and 500 iterations of the attack. The experiment is done on ImageNet using
ResNet-50 for ∞ = 0.05. Note that a misclassification is achieved when the margin
loss becomes negative
34 M. Andriushchenko et al.
E.6 Breaking the Post-averaging Defense
We investigate whether the l∞-robustness claims of [36] hold (as reported in
https://www.robust-ml.org/preprints/). Their defense method is a random-
ized averaging method similar in spirit to [18]. The difference is that [36] sample
from the surfaces of several d-dimensional spheres instead of the Gaussian dis-
tribution, and they do not derive any robustness certificates, but rather measure
robustness by the PGD attack. We use the hyperparameters specified in their
code (K=15, R=6 on CIFAR-10 and K=15, R=30 on ImageNet). We show in
Table 12 that the proposed defense can be broken by the l∞-Square Attack,
which is able to reduce the robust accuracy suggested by PGD from 88.4% to
15.8% on CIFAR-10 and from 76.1% to 0.4% on ImageNet (we set p = 0.3 for our
attack). This again highlights that straightforward application of gradient-based
white-box attacks may lead to inaccurate robustness estimation, and usage of
the Square Attack can prevent false robustness claims.
Table 12. l∞-robustness of the post-averaging randomized defense [36]. The Square
Attack shows that these models are not robust
∞ Dataset
Robust accuracy
Clean PGD Square
8/255
CIFAR-10 92.6% 88.4% 15.8%
ImageNet 77.3% 76.1% 0.4%
